DCI/IC 73-1254
2 November 1973

STAT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT   :   ASD(I) COINS Proposal for Security and
                    Monitoring Program - IRAC Meeting,
                    5 November 1973

        1. The principal detail in the ASD(I) paper transmitted
by Dr. Hall's memorandum to Mr. Colby of 4 October concerns
a proposal for upgraded COINS communication support. A fiscal
plan appears at page 4.

        2. The last line of that fiscal plan proposes funding
STAT   of [   ] in FY-75 for "Security and
Monitoring Program." There is no textual explanation.

        3. From materials prepared by the COINS Project Manage-
ment Office for briefing the PFIAB on 6 September 73, it
appears that this security proposal involves:

        (a) Security for an ARPA-Type Network, including
multi-level security;

        (b) Security monitoring system for COINS when the
network is in operations; and

        (c) Computer security laboratory, at NSA. (This
appears to be a tentative rather than a firm proposal.)

        4. My analysis of these proposals is as follows:

        (a) The CIA response to the proposal for upgrading
the COINS communication network notes that "the issue of
security has not been adequately treated, and ... network
planning should incorporate security protection as a
deliberate and necessary design goal."

        (b) In CIA, between January 1972 and January 1973,
the Office of Security with contractor support conducted
its first comprehensive security analysis, testing and
evaluation of a major CIA remotely accessed resource-
sharing computer system. The project covered not only

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the traditional aspects of physical protection and
personnel access but also the hardware and software
security attributes of the system, an IBM 360 Model
67 under Control Program 67. The CIA Director of
Security reports:

> "(a) strong evidence of serious security
> weaknesses in the operating system, conso-
> nant with a similar conclusion in the secur-
> ity test of the DIA On Line System (DIAOLS);
> and

> "(b) convincing argument that the pursuit
> of such test efforts is profitable and valid
> as a basis for system security certification
> and/or remedial action."

> Director of Security memo to
> IC/IHC, 1 November 73 (C)

(c) <u>ASD(I) did not present a description of its
security proposals</u> along with the cost figures contained
in their transmittal of 4 October 73. Our information
on the direction of their planning is derived from the
COINS Project Manager's presentation to PFIAB on 6 Sep-
tember.73.

(d) <u>There is no doubt that there is a major group
of problems under the general heading of computer security,
and that funding is needed to study this area.</u>

(e) <u>Some of the activities</u>, illustrative of the
thrashing around in government and industry, to "get
a handle" on the problem of computer security include
the following:

(1) ASD (Comptroller) chairs a Computer
Security Committee.

(2) The Navy's Ship R&D Center held a
symposium on this subject in 1972.

(3) A September 73 draft of the National
COMSEC Plan for Computer Systems, prepared by
NSA for the U.S. Communications Security Board,
is now circulating for comments.

(4) OSD reportedly has sent a letter recently to the Director, NSA proposing that NSA be responsible for computer security within DoD, and requesting views and comments on this proposal.

(5) OMB has been pressing the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) to serve as a focal point for computer security between the U.S. Government and industry, with NSA becoming responsible for this subject within the Federal government.

(6) The Executive Secretary, IHC has just returned from attendance at a 3 day symposium, sponsored by IBM, on this subject, with participants from industry, government and academia.

(f) <u>Expert commentary</u>. Dr. Ruth Davis, Director of the Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, National Bureau of Standards, addressed the USIB Intelligence Information Handling Committee (IHC) on 15 November 72 on this topic. Her comments included the following:

"10. Dr. Hellner asked how far away we were from a reasonable solution to the multi-level problem. Dr. Davis thought that it would be about 2 - 2 1/2 years until the first step is completed; i.e., providing guidelines which will handle a majority of the computer security problems in the public sector. For adequate technological results that would be used for the next generation system architecture, and addressing computer utilization in such a way that it is not necessary to come up with a patch-work solution which would thereby decrease cost effectiveness, she thought the answer was about 4 years away. This meant assimilating the results of all agencies' R&D whether it was in the intelligence community or not and developing mechanisms to apply it properly."

Minutes of 51st IHC Meeting

(g) <u>The DCI has a direct responsibility</u>. The statutory charge on the DCI to protect intelligence sources and methods leaves to him the ultimate responsibility for passing judgment on whatevery resolution is finally proposed for these problems after studies and tests have been completed.

(h) <u>There has been a history</u>, extending over a good number of years, of DCI concern with these problems, both in the USIB Security Committee and the USIB Intelligence Information Handling Committee. Those two groups have worked together to bring their special insights to bear in a joint effort. The latter committee (IHC) has been the point of contact with the National Bureau of Standards.

(i) <u>In these premises, DCI should consider</u> indicating to ASD(I) that this is an area of such diversity that a combined DCI-ASD(I) approach appears desirable. A working arrangement, involving ASD(I), the COINS Project Management Officer, and the DCI's staff and committee mechanisms, should be agreed to.

(j) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the funds requested by ASD(I) for FY-74 should be approved now, and the FY-75 funds should be approved now for fiscal planning purposes.

(1) A project on securing the ARPA-type <u>communication network should probably be gotten underway</u> as soon as the network is approved. Time is already overly brief to address this problem in the same time frame as the installation of the network itself.

(2) <u>A security monitoring system for COINS</u> when the new network is in operation is required, and R&D is necessary for its design. The sooner this can be gotten underway, the better off we will be at the other end, in view of the lead time required. This is subject to the assumption that enough is known about the problem by ASD(I) and the COINS Project Management Office to adopt a sound solution.

(3) The <u>computer security laboratory</u> could perform useful and needed tasks for the COINS Project Management Office now and on a continuing basis. In that respect it is already needed, and funding should be available now. In a larger sense, we do not now have the information on which to express an opinion as to the total mission and functions of that facility and its relative desirability.

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Acting Chairman, IHC

cc: Executive Secretary, IRAC

IHC Reading

6 November 73

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Re: Follow-up on COINS Item at IRAC Meeting of 5 November 73

1. There may be a major issue emerging as between the Commo people and Security people in CIA as to their relative roles in the multi-level computer security problem.   **25X1**

2. I don't understand how this relates to the possible role of NSA that you referred to as possibly being designated by OSD as a focal point for computer security in DoD (or maybe the whole Federal establishment?)

3. This is also tied up with [ ] plans for working on the   **25X1** computer security problem for COINS. See ASDI proposal to IRAC, in which

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4. Will you, please:

    a. Pull these threads together and give me a simple picture of what's upp.

    b. Based thereon, give me your opinion as to what role our office (either USIB/IHC, or DCI/IC/IHC has in all this.

Thanks.

cc: NCF memo of 2 Nov 73   **25X1**

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6 Nov 73

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Per telecon, he are my rough notes from the COINS discussion. I am not certain what decisions were taken, or implied, because(I guess) I do not have experience with what appears to be WEC's very understated way of making decisions. I know that Solat and Albrechta share this confusion.

Thus, if WEC -- in your opionion or [ ] -- does feel

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strongly about some points on COINS, I suggest you try to bring this out as part of your official minutes of the meeting. Otherwise, it will go over the head of the people who are supposed to be acting thereon, and will perpetuate confusion and possible disagreement.

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Please send me a copy of whatever you finally include. Thanks.

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